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This thesis contains an examination, analysis, and commen-
tary upon the prospective use of slurry pipelines as a sup-
plemental means of coal transportation in support of the an-
nounced United States goal to double coal production by 1985.
It examines the rudiments of the slurry industry and traces
its growth to the present. A thorough review of the technical,
legal, and political aspects of the controversial issues in-
fluencing the construction and operations of long distance
coal pipelines is presented along with a commentary on the
cases for and against slurries. Finally, sets of both general
and specific conclusions are offered regarding the potential
use of the coal pipelines.

TABLE OF CONTENTS




III. BACKGROUND - -- --- - 13
A. GENERAL 13
B. THE BLACK MESA PIPELINE 18
C. THE ALTON PIPELINES 21
D
.
THE GULF INTERSTATE-NORTHWEST PIPELINE 2 4
E. THE SAN MARCO PIPELINE 27
F. THE WYTEX PIPELINE 29
G. ENERGY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, INC.
(ETSI) PIPELINE 3 2
H. THE CADIZ (OHIO) PIPELINE 34
I. THE FLORIDA PIPELINE 34
IV. THE ISSUES 38
A. EMINENT DOMAIN 40
1. Its Definition and Origin 40
2. Federal Legislation 45
3. State Legislation 49
4. Judicial Decision 53
B ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 5 3
C. THE RAIL SLURRY COMPETITION ISSUES 68
1. The Issue of Need 69
2. The Competitive Issue 7 3
3. The Economics Issue 76
D . WATER USE 30
5

V. THE CASE FOR COAL SLURRY PIPELINES 8 7
VI. THE CASE AGAINST COAL SLURRY PIPELINES 9
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 94
A. GENERAL 94
B. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 9 6
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 99
APPENDIX A 10 °
LIST OF REFERENCES 101
BIBLIOGRAPHY 108





COAL SLURRY SYSTEMS 16
2. BLACK MESA PIPELINE 19
3. ALTON PIPELINE --- 22
4 . GULF INTERSTATE NORTHWEST PIPELINE 2 5
5. SAN MARCO PIPELINE 28
6. SYTEX PIPELINE 31
7. ETSI PIPELINE 33
8. CADIZ PIPELINE 3 5
9. FLORIDA PIPELINE 37
10. STATES SUPPORTING EMINENT DOMAIN FOR SLURRIES 5 2
11. STATES SUPPORTING STRONG ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY





COAL SLURRY SYSTEMS 17
II. RESPONSES TO DOE QUESTIONNAIRE 60
III. PERCENTAGE OF FEDERALLY-OWNED LAND 86

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, coal transportation has been
a heavily lobbied and debated issue in both the Congress and
various state legislatures. Numerous arguments on whether coal
slurry pipelines should be granted the power of "eminent domain"
for the purpose of acquiring rights-of-way have been presented.
Various industrial, labor, consumer, environmental, and gov-
ernmental groups have taken sides on the issue and made count-
less numbers of statements in support of their views. Despite
this flurry of activity, no consensus has been reached either
on the central issue of granting eminent domain or any of the
emergent side issues.
During the past several years the intensity of debate
regarding coal slurry issues has increased dramatically. An
increased awareness of the nation's declining oil and gas sup-
plies coupled with the vulnerability of continued dependence
on imported energy has forced the United States to reevaluate
the future of coal, its most abundant fossil fuel, and to
move toward its increased use. The expanded use of coal de-
pends heavily on the availability and adequacy of economical
long distance transportation to move the coal from the mine
to consumer. Typically, coal transportation service has been
in the domain of the railroads except in rare instances where
unique factors have made other modes substantially more eco-
nomical or convenient.

Because the public, the Congress, and the President all
realized the urgency of America's energy crisis, it was poli-
tically expedient that some action be taken to ensure the
energy independence of the United States. As President Carter
forwarded his proposed National Energy Plan (NEP) to Congress
in January 1977, he characterized and underscored the magnitude
of the energy problem as follows:
In each period of our history, the Nation has
responded to challenges which have demanded the best
in all of us.
This is one of those times.
Our energy crisis is an invisible crisis, which
grows steadily worse - even when it is not in the
news. It has taken decades to develop, as our demand
for energy has grown much faster than our supply. It
will take decades to solve. But we still have time
to find answers in the planned, orderly way - if we define




The objective of this thesis is to examine, analyze, and
comment upon the use of coal slurry pipelines in light of a
number of decisions which require the increased use of coal
in overcoming America's energy problems. Of the multitude
of issues raised by the opponents of coal slurries, only the
four most volatile concerns will be discussed in this paper
due to time and financial constraints imposed upon the author.
These concerns include: (1) eminent domain; (2) environmental
issues; (3) railroad/slurry competition issues; and (4) water
use provisions.
While this paper will not attempt to evaluate the use of
coal as a fuel, comment will be made where problems involving
expanded coal use relate to slurry pipeline construction and
operation. Since such tense issues as those regarding air
pollution or mining methods will not be discussed, it should
be noted that such topics require resolution if a viable slurry
industry is to develop.
Each of the presently existing or proposed coal slurries
will be examined. A short background statement, a comment
concerning its present status, and a note of any significant
activity will be related as appropriate to the discussion of
the four problem areas. This dissertation will expose the




In that a considerable number of recent studies have been
made regarding the general subject of coal slurries, this paper
will attempt to integrate the prevailing views of a majority
of the experts in the field of energy transportation as it
relates to the coal slurry concept. The ultimate objective of
this document is to provide the reader with sufficient data
upon which to draw an informative conclusion regarding the need
for coal slurries and some perspective as to how best to use
and monitor them if their construction is ultimately supported.
Since water and truck transport have not been a focal point
in the arguments concerning the movement of Western Coal, any
comments in regard to those methods will be only incidental.
Additionally, the basic issues will be limited to those re-
garding low sulfur Western Coal rather than those of a national
nature because all of the proposed slurry projects are generally
localized in the Rocky Mountain Area with the exception of the re-
cently announced Florida pipeline. Comments regarding the Florida
pipeline will be made only under qualification since little is
known about the project.
While it is known that the conclusions presented in this
study will not be acceptable to all of the parties involved in
the slurry debate, it is believed that they represent an objec-
tive summation and that they will hopefully assist in providing





Coal slurry pipelines have received increasing attention
on both the national and state levels over the past five years.
Because they represent a new dimension in pipelining, this
period has been compared to the early days of the oil pipelines.
More appropriately though, this phase of slurryism can be re-
lated to the natural gas pipeline industry in the 1950 's, a
time of considerable growth and turbulence for that industry
[2:1]
.
Only a short time ago, it seemed incomprehensible that
coal could be transported by underground pipelines, much like
oil and gas products that were being moved in the nearly half-
million mile pipeline networks that exist in this country. In
developing the slurry concept, its advocates found it unusual
whenever they were not required to explain what "slurry" meant
to anyone with whom they had contact. To an extent now, there
are enlightened audiences that are growing quickly. Currently,
the mere expression of the term can evoke an immediate emotional
reaction, whether it be pro or con. Few middle-of-the-roaders
exist on the slurry question because the stakes, whether measured
in terms of money, water, or environmental quality, are ex-
tremely high.
In fact, the concept of moving coal by pipeline is not
new. The first U.S. patent was granted in 18 91 to Wallace C.
Andrews, who had constructed an actual pilot plant on the
13

corner of 58th Street and Madison Avenue in New York City. His
creation stretched across several vacant lots and looked much
like an amusement park roller-coaster because he had built
wooden trestles to support the pipeline and to simulate hills
and valleys. Although no record can be found to substantiate
any commercial application of Andrew's invention, it is known
that he built and exhibited a second coal slurry at the Columbia
World's Fair held in Chicago in 18 93'. At that event, Andrews
was given an award for his creativity [3:3] .
Since that auspicious beginning, only two operational
coal slurries have been built in the United States. The first
was the Cadiz (Ohio) Pipeline which began operation in 1957
and ran successfully for six years. It was retired when it had
completed its primary mission, the forced reduction of the rail
rates for coal deliveries in that part of the country [4:267] .
The second, the Black Mesa Pipeline in Arizona, has been in
continuous operation since 1970. Serving Southern California
Edison (SCE) , it is the sole source of fuel for the 1500MW
Mojave power plant in southern Nevada. The experience of this
system has been excellent as indicated by the statement of
SCE's Chairman of the Board, Jack K. Horton, before the House
Interior Committee in March of 197 5:
From the time the pipeline began commercial opera-
tion on November 1, 1970, it has been needed to transport
coal for 4 0,8 96 hours and (it) has been available for 4 0,554
hours . . . Our experience to date indicates that the Black
Mesa Pipeline has transported coal to the Mojave plant at a
cost benefit of nearly 50% below that of alternative trans-
portation costs. Another of the more attractive features
of the slurry pipeline is the relative freedom from infla-
tionary impacts: . . . therefore, substantial savings are
not only being realized, but are anticipated to continue
to the benefit of millions of electric power consumers




Based upon Mr. Horton ' s statement one could generally con-
clude that the technology of slurries is well proven, reliable,
and cost effective, but there are many who would challenge
these concepts. For instance, Louis Menk, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer for the Burlington Northern Railroad, testi-
fied before the House Interior Committee on November 7, 197 5,
that:
Coal slurry lines ordinarily cannot be self-
supporting. . . pipeline technology is in its infancy. . .
costly developmental problems will impair the pro-
jected transportation savings ... of coal pipelines.
[5:15]
With Mr. Menk ' s and Mr. Horton "s sworn testimony exhibited,
it becomes apparent that diametrically opposed views exist,
not only on the issues, but also on the facts, regarding coal
slurry pipelines. These contradictions are not only existent
on top level views, but they pervade the entire body of know-
ledge regarding the subject of coal distribution in America.
It is with this perspective that antithetical opinions are ram-
pant that this study will examine the issues of eminent domain,
environmental concern, rail-pipe competition, and water use
as they relate to the construction and operation of coal
slurries
.
Prior to discussing the issues, it would be prudent to
submit data pertinent to the major coal slurry projects either
in operation or under proposal in the United States today.
The routes of the eight major systems are shown in Exhibit 1
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B. THE BLACK MESA PIPELINE
The Black Mesa Pipeline is 278 miles in length and crosses
the rugged terrain of northern Arizona from Black Mesa, near
Kayenta, to the Mojave power project in Southern Nevada. (See
Exhibit 2) Built for $39 million in the 1968-1970 time frame,
this system is presently the only active coal slurry in the
United States [6:24] . Its initial 266 miles ran as an 18-inch
line over terrain that rises and falls in altitude between 500
and 6500 feet and then the pipeline tapered to a 12-inch pipe
over the last 12 miles as the elevation drops 3 000 feet [7:108 6]
.
The line was established after Southern California Edison
began searching for an alternative to higher than anticipated
rail cost for supplying its Mojave generating plant. When the
pipeline was initially proposed in 1966, the Southern Pacific
Railroad directed its subsidiary Southern Pacific Pipelines to
investigate the feasibility of building a coal slurry line.
After research determined that such a project could be economically
productive, Southern Pacific Pipelines created the Black Mesa
Pipeline Company to build and operate the Black Mesa Pipeline
[7:1086] .
The pipeline's water needs are supplied by a set of five
deep wells near Kayenta, Arizona. The wells, each over 3 000 feet
deep, are steel encased to prevent seepage into or out of the
wells into the potable, shallow water supplies of the local
areas. At full capacity, the wells provide 4200 gallons of water





5.8 feet per second (fps) . The slurry transit time from Black
Mesa to Mojave is 67 hours and the line holds approximately
45,000 tons of coal at any one time. The four pump stations
employ the world's largest postiive-displacement pumps to move
their cargo. The pumps, driven by 17 00 hp General Electric
Motors, use 12-inch pistons except at the Gray Mountain booster
station, where slightly scaled down 157 hp motors drive pumps
with 10-inch pistons [8:45]. At each station, there are
dump ponds with enough capacity to hold all of the slurry car-
ried in the upstream portion of the pipeline. These ponds,
built as contingency measures, would be used only in case of an
emergency which necessitates the emptying of the line [7:1086] .
The pipeline is fully automated. It is run by a four-man
shift at Kayenta and is controlled by means of a General Elec-
tric GETAC 7 020 Supervisory Control System. A solid state micro-
wave system is employed to pass commands between the control and
operating systems. The four-man crew, as well as the monitoring
system, continually check the slurry for per cent of solids,
density, specific gravity, ph and flow rate. Only once has the
line been plugged during operation and that was in its first
half-year of operation. Following a restart subsequent to
several power failures, a forty-foot plug of solid coal developed
within the pipe. It was removed by a proprietary method developed
by the Black Mesa Pipeline Co. and there has been no such problem
since [7:1086]
.
The system has completed over eight years of successful
operations. It is considered by its parent company to be both
20

a technical and an economic success. While it is capable of
transporting over five million tons of coal per year, it has
averaged only about four million due to the burn rate of the
power plant. However, the need for electric energy in the
Southwest has begun to accelerate and the coal burn rate has been
increasing as evidenced by the pipeline's 1977 throughput fig-
ure of 4.6 million tons.
Black Mesa's manager, John Montfort, projects that, "There
is definitely a future for coal slurry pipelines in the United
States." [7:1086]
C. THE ALTON PIPELINES
Actually two pipelines will be constructed under this pro-
posal by the Nevada Power Company. (See Exhibit 3) The two
lines are one of the five components in what is called the Allen-
Warner Valley Energy System. The longer of the two pipelines
will run from the Alton coal fields in southern Utah to the
Harry Allen Generating Station twenty miles north of Las Vegas.
It will consist of 164 miles of 22-inch pipe and 19 miles of
20-inch pipe. It is designed to deliver 9.1 million tons of
coal annually. Its smaller parallel sister will consist of 68
miles of 12-inch pipe and five miles of 8-inch pipe and it
will deliver 2.5 million tons of coal annually to the Warner
Valley Generating Station. Both pipelines are designed to





Exh i bit 3
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The temporary construction rights-of-way will be 100-feet
wide while the operational rights-of-way will be one-half of
that. The rights-of-way will be mostly unencumbered and will
be returned to the pre-existing uses after the completion of
construction. Of the 183 miles to be crossed, 142 are federal
lands, 21 are state or county lands, and only 2 are private
[9:4] .
Water will be supplied from a deep ground water aquifer in
the Navajo Sandstone Formation. The two lines are expected to
use between 54 00 and 7800 acre-feet per year, depending upon
the burn rates at the two generating stations and the amount
of inherent moisture in the coal [9:4].
The Alton's preliminary environmental and engineering studies
were performed by Engineering Management, Inc., under the di-
rection of the Black Mesa Pipeline Co.. In April of 1974,
Nevada Power submitted a six-volume report to the Bureau of
Land Management to supply the Federal government with the data
necessary for the completion of the Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) required by the National Environmental Policy Act.
Since September of 1975, the government has continually returned
for additional information and Nevada Power has submitted an
additional six volumes in a piecemeal fashion [9:5] .
Nevada Power has been somewhat dismayed by continuous gov-
ernmental back-peddling and stalling tactics. John Arlidge,
assistant to the Vice-President of Nevada Power, stated in a
speech at the Second International Conference on Slurry Trans-
portation in 1977 that changes in the Federal review process
23

had caused long delays in the Alton project. As an example,
he described how a change in the Department of Interior's policy
on reviewing future coal leases had caused his company a two-
year delay. He continued that the power utility industry as a
whole was seriously concerned about the lengthy delays being
caused by government red tape. He asserted that growing regula-
tions had caused "a three-fold increase in time and a six-fold
increase in cost" over the requirements for construction of uti-
lity projects since 1960 [9:6].
The Alton's approved EIS is expected to be issued by mid-
1979 and it will clear the way for obtaining the necessary per-
mits required for the construction of the energy system. Although
pipeline construction will require only one year, it will be de-
layed while the power plant generating units, the constraining
elements in the project, are sequenced in over a nine-year span.
The first units will go on line in 1983 at Warner Valley and in
198 5 at Las Vegas' Allen Station. Subsequent units will be
phased in at one-year intervals at both sites following installa-
tion of the inaugural units. The pipelines' initial operations
will coincide with the beginning operations of their respective
power plants [9:7].
D. THE GULF INTERSTATE NORTHWEST PIPELINE
This pipeline, originally proposed by Gulf Interstate Cor-
poration of Houston and Northwest Pipe Company of Salt Lake City
in 197 5, has become little more than a market study. (See Ex-
hibit 4) The original feasibility study called for a pipeline








various Pacific Northwest locations. (Specifically announced
as Bordman, Oregon.) [10] The pipeline would have been between
2 and 24 inches in diameter although a number of other sizes
were also researched.
When the proposal was originally announced, it was spurned
by the utility companies of the Pacific Northwest even though
all of the available dam sites in the hydro-electric rich area
were in use. Because of environmentalist pressure to maintain
the air quality of the region, the utilities had made a conscious
choice to move toward nuclear generating capability over the
foreseeable future rather than use coal-fired plants. Accord-
ingly, the pipeline proposal was shelved, but it has not been
dismissed.
Ed Hayes of Northwest Pipe stated in January of 197 9 that
"
. . . if a substantial switch from nuclear to coal were made,
then the pipeline would be restudied for the earliest possible
construction." According to Mr. Hayes, Northwest's present de-
sire would be to build a 48-inch line of 7 00 to 8 00 miles from
Wyoming along the Snake River to Boise, Idaho, and then over to
Washington or Oregon. The desire would be to have multiple pick-
up and drop points, at least two of the former and as many as
five of the latter. It was projected that the maximum water
requirement for a plan of this magnitude would be 200,000 acre-
feet over a twenty-year period. Northwest's opinion as to
construction cost in 197 9 dollars for such a venture was set at
roughly one and a half billion dollars. Although design could
be accomplished within a year and actual construction could be
accomplished in a three-year period, Hayes believed that without
26

help in each of the four basic problem areas to be discussed in
the following chapter, it would require in excess of twelve years
to construct a slurry as things presently exist [10]
.
E. THE SAN MARCO PIPELINE
Interestingly enough, the San Marco Pipeline, like the
Black Mesa, is another railroad venture. It is co-sponsored by
Rio Grande Industries, owner of the Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad (D&RGWRR) , and Houston Natural Gas Co. Designed to run
approximately 900 miles from Walsenburg, Colorado, to Angleton,
Texas, it will employ nineteen pump stations to maintain a flow
rate of 5.7 to 6.5 FPS. (See Exhibit 5)
The pipeline will be controlled by a central supervisory
system in Colorado and will be unmanned elsewhere. Microwave
transmission, backed by redundant land lines, will provide for
control communications [11:12]. The line is designed to have a
222-mile feeder spur of 16-inch diameter from Farmington, NM, to
Walsenburg, which would deliver approximately five million tons
of coal to the origin each year. It was envisioned that the
D&RGWRR would deliver the additional coal required for the line
from mines in the Walsenburg area.
From Walsenburg, it was planned that a 625-mile segment of
28-inch pipe would be run to Temple, Texas, in which fifteen
million tons of slurry would be carried. Five million tons would
be used in Temple and the remaining ten million tons would be run
through a 90-mile segment of 24-inch pipe to Fayette, Texas,
where another 2.5 million tons would be dropped. The remaining




















Surface water was not available in the Walsenburg area to
supply the 10, 000-acre-feet per year required; therefore, the San
Marco Pipeline Co. had to run several hydrological engineering
studies to validate whether or not any of several potential
nearby water sources could be depended upon for long-term use.
One area near the New Mexico border appeared to meet the pipe-
line's requirements and the land and its water rights were
purchased; however, the San Marco Company, in accordance with
Colorado and New Mexico law, must prove that an adequate quantity
of water exists in the aquifer to meet its needs without jeo-
pardizing the existing water balance in the general area. In
the last quarter of 1978 an eleven-inch test well was drilled
at the water development site and approximately 3 200 gallons
per minute (GPM) were extracted with no drawdown on the aquifer.
A 10-day legal test was run in December 197 8 to be used as evi-
dence of the adequacy of the water supply in a presently scheduled
March 197 9 water court hearing. San Marco officials hope that
the water issue will be resolved by June, 1979 [12:1]
.
F. THE WYTEX PIPELINE
In this proposal prepared by Brown and Root, TETCO, and Shell
Oil Co., the coal is to be surface mined at four sites in the
Power River Basin of Wyoming and delivered to crushing plants ad-
jacent to each mine. After crushing and blending to make pumpable
slurry, the coal will be fed through eighteen-inch gathering lines
to the main slurry pipeline. The main line will be a 3 6-inch,
1260 mile pipe traversing five states and terminating near the
Texas Fulf Coast. (See Exhibit 6) The line will have a capacity
29

of 21.6 million tons annually and will employ eleven booster
stations along its route.
This pipeline design proposal features distribution pipe-
lines which may branch from the main slurry at any point where a
suitable customer is found. Each branch line could deliver up
to 5.4 million tons per year. At the end of each branch and at
the terminus of the main line, dewatering plants would be built
to remove most of the slurry's free water, whereupon the coal
would be delivered to the using site for grinding, drying, and
subsequent burning. Preliminary investigation has also been
accomplished on this pipeline using both 42 and 48-inch pipelines
and consideration has also been given to the construction of a
Texas to Wyoming water return line.
Although no water supply exists as yet for this proposal, the
following circumstances do exist. The project will require nearly
11,000 gallons of water per minute. Since the passage of restric-
tive legislation in Montana in 1973 (The Montana Water Use Act)
,
it is known that no water from Montana could be used in the pro-
ject. Because the ETSI pipeline had been able to secure Wyoming
water by act of the state legislature, it is possible that this
project could attempt similar action. If water were to be granted,
it is planned that eight wells would be sunk in the Madison aquifer
to provide water. Only six of the wells would be required at any
one time with a seventh used for standby maintenance and the







G. ENERGY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, INC. (ETSI) PIPELINE
The ETSI pipeline is the most highly developed of the pre-
sently proposed large slurries. Although announced in 197 5 as a
103 6 mile 38-inch line to run from Gillette, Wyoming, to White
Bluff, Arkansas, via Nebraska and Kansas, its length and routing
have been subject to change proposals which would run it through
Colorado and Oklahoma while retaining its origin and destination
sites [14:7]. As recently as January, 1978, it was announced
that an extension would be built to Baton Rouge, LA, which would
increase its overall length to 1378 miles [15:7]. (See Exhibit
7)
Designed to move 25 million tons of coal per year from the
Powder River Basin, the pipeline is sponsored by ETSI to support
Middle South Utilities (MSU) , a five-state utility conglomerate
located in the lower Mississippi Valley. MSU has reported that
it expects to use the ETSI line in excess of thirty years.
Water usage for the project is expected to run approximately
15,000 acre feet per year. After an extensive lobbying effort,
ETSI has received authority from the Wyoming legislature to use
20,000 acre feet of Wyoming water annually in support of its pro-
ject. The water will be taken from the Madison aquifer by drilling
deep (2500 feet) wells [14:1].
Despite ETSI's successes in obtaining customers and water
rights, there have been problems in the securing of rights-of-way.
Until late 1978, it appeared that ETSI's inability to secure the
required construction and operating rights-of-way from various









ultimate construction of the pipeline; however, in a serious of
66 court victories, ETSI now appears ready to build [17:7] .
H. THE CADIZ (OHIO) PIPELINE
The Cadiz pipeline was the first of the modern slurries.
No study could be complete without a discussion of the now
"moth-balled" Cadiz line. Part of the significance of this line
exists in that no commercial coal slurry had ever existed prior
to its construction. Constructed and owned by the Consolidated
Coal Co. (CONSOL) of Pittsburg, PA, the 110-mile 10-inch pipe-
line ran from Cadiz, Ohio, up to Cleveland Illuminating Company's
Eastlake Power Station near Lake Erie. (See Exhibit 8) It em-
ployed three pumping stations, each using three 450 Lp positive
displacement double action duplex piston pumps capable of pump-
ing 1100 GPM. The line was in operation for six years and ex-
perienced an availability rate in excess of 98 percent. It
averaged over 1.3 million tons of coal moved annually during its
active lifetime [18:555].
Since its shutdown in 1962, it has remained idle. Only once
has an active proposal been made to reopen the line and that was
as a garbage slurry to remove a sizable portion of Cleveland's
waste to the Cadiz area. Local opposition in the Cadiz area
forced an end to that proposal [19:3-2].
I. THE FLORIDA PIPELINE
The Florida Pipeline is the newest of the coal slurry pro-
posals and it is the first active one in the eastern coal regions








running from Eastern Kentucky to Southern Florida, the project
has remained flexible as to origin and destination according
to Jim Kaufman of Florida Gas [2 0] . In fact, the initial feasi-
bility study looked seriously at the coal in Illinois, Tennessee,
Ohio, Kentucky, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina
[21:6] .
At the time of the slurry's announcment, Florida Gas had com-
pleted its initial feasibility study and a limited marketing
study. It concluded that the kind of pipeline it desired to build
would run approximately $1.6 billion (1978 dollars). Since that
time, the company has completed a second level study which has
been closely guarded. Kaufman suggests that Florida Gas is near
term in announcing its final plans and that the slurry could be
built quickly "if everything went right" [2 0]
.
Prospective customers along the slurry's route include Georgia
Power, Florida Power, Seminole Electric, Florida Power and Light,
Tampa Electric and Gulf Power Co.; however, Kaufman cautions that
other utility systems have not been excluded. Florida gas expects
both the Seabord Coast Line and the Southern Railroad to put up
stiff competition to their construction efforts. Both of these
railroads are in good financial health and they represent a for-
midable challence. In the absence of federal legislation granting
the power of eminent domain, Florida Gas sees little point in be-
ginning their pipeline. It is their position that legislation
is much more positive and certainly is less expensive than the








This chapter will discuss four of the most volatile problem
areas which have in the past or are presently delaying the con-
struction of coal slurry pipelines in the United States. The
most long-standing and probably the central issue has been one
emanating from the slurries 1 inability to secure right-of-way
rights. In this argument over passage rights, the slurries have
fought for the right of eminent domain at both the state and
federal levels. In addition, judicial action has been exercised
in a number of cases to ensure the use of rights-of-way along
the route of the ETSI Pipeline.
Because the eminent domain fight has lingered for nearly
two decades, a number of other issues have arisen. These emer-
gent issues have had a dramatic effect on the budding slurry
industry in general and specifically on the right-of-way issue.
One of these new issues, that of preventing environmental
damage was born with the initiation of an environmentalist move-
ment during the late 1950' s and early 1960 's. Although the en-
vironmentalists remain formidable as a group, the real effect
of the movement upon industry presently lies in a number of fed-
eral and state agencies which have been created in response to
environmentalists pressures to administer, evaluate, and monitor
the programs which have been set up by legislative mandate,
presidential edict, or judicial decree. Federal legislation
regarding clean air and water, ecological damage, and other
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environmental impacts have placed substantial burdens on all
industries, including coal slurries, to protect the environment.
The slurry industry will be examined with respect to its respon-
sibilities under the growing body of environmental law and with
regard to its response to environmentalist groups.
A third issue affecting the establishment of the proposed coal
slurry pipelines is that of slurry-railroad competition. Again,
a number of side issues have arisen, those of transportation
regulation, energy consumption and use of construction resources,
come into play whenever a discussion involves this, the competi-
tive aspect. The railroads have stedfastly accused the slurry
advocates of misrepresenting its economic benefit and of down-
playing the railroad's ability to transport the nation's coal.
In turn, the slurrymen have complained that the railroads are
out to stifle competition and maintain a monopolistic advantage.
Consumers, such as industry and utilities, are anxiously taking
sides on the issues in hopes of gaining a competitive advantage
if their side wins.
The final dominant issue to be discussed in this chapter
will be in regard to the use of scarce western water. The water
issue became a paramount concern only because nature chose to
place America's vast quantities of low-sulfur coal west of the
Mississippi River where the annual rainfall is about one-fourth
of the amount found in the Eastern United States. Hugh quanti-
ties of easily-mined coal lie near the surface of much of the
Northern Great Plains States where only 10-12 inches of rain
falls annually. Unfortunately, most of the presently proposed
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coal slurries have been designed to haul coal from this parti-
cular region where water has been typically closely guarded
as a precious commodity. Had the slurries been proposed to move
eastern coal/ a water issue would probably never have emerged,
but the pipelines were planned for the West, the issue does exist,
and it has proven to be quite significant because of its impor-
tance to the populus in general.
These four issues: (1) eminent domain, (2) environmental
concern, (3) rail-slurry competition, and (4) water use have
become the primary obstacles to the furtherance of a bona-fide
coal slurry industry. Unless the slurry proponents can overcome
their opposition in each of these areas, they are destined for
"pipedr earns , " not pipelines.
A. EMINENT DOMAIN
1 . Its Definition and Origin
Before entering a detailed discussion of the activities
surrounding the passage of eminent domain legislation, it would
be worthy to define eminent domain and describe its origin and
use in this country. Eminent domain is commonly applied to acts
in which the state takes private property for a public use. As
a concept it actually comes from the right of expropriation which
developed in English law as:
... the right or power of the sovereign, or those
to whom power has been delegated, to condemn private
property for public use, and to appropriate ownership
and possession thereof for such use upon paying the
owner a due compensation. [22:6]
The phrase, eminent domain, appears to have been coined
in 1625 by Hugo Grotius in his book entitled The Law of War and
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Peace. Grotius stated that "property of subjects belong to
the state under the right of eminent domain." [22:6]
The importance of eminent domain to the slurry industry
is in the area of right-of-way acquisition. Rights-of-way are
an important component in bringing a long-distance coal pipe-
line to fruition. It is necessary to obtain permits for the
crossings of highways, railroads, rivers, streams, and canals.
Approvals are required from federal, state and local govern-
ments and their agencies for any crossing of public lands and
although these approvals were nearly automatic a few years ago,
some difficulty has arisen in the past few years as a result of
environmental pressures. The effects that environmental policies
have had upon access through public lands will be delayed until
the section on environmental concerns.
In addition to public permits, pipeline easements are
also required for passage through privately owned parcels or
property. Most of the requirements for such passage have been
met through routine purchase methods, and while with minor excep-
tion no problems would arise in the construction of a pipeline,
one group of private owners have proven to be a major obstacle
in allowing the slurry pipeline builders passage rights. This
group, the American railroads, has vehemently opposed the con-
struction and operation of coal slurries . The railroads have
historically refused crossing permits to any form of competition.
As early as 1874, when the Columbia Conduit System, a Pennsylvania
based crude oil pipeline company, attempted to build a sixty-mile
line from Millerstown, PA, to Pittsburgh, the railroads have
employed this philosophy. A single railroad crossing blocked
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the pipeline's passage and the railroad company steadfastly
refused to allow the line's completion despite the passage of
an 187 2 statue which granted the privilege of eminent domain
to all common carrier pipelines. The pipeline circumvented the
railroad's efforts by building the pipeline to within a few
feet of each side of the rail crossing and using a horse-drawn
tank wagon to transport the oil across the tracks. By 187 5,
the courts forced the railroad to give passage and the pipeline
was completed [5:44].
Although the preceding story would indicate that small
special interest groups cannot block the long-terms needs of
the public, the railroads have not ceased in using this method-
ology to halt competitors. In 1942, the rail industry, despite
the country's war-time needs for petroleum, effectively blocked
the construction of a number of oil pipelines in various states
where the law did not provide the pipeline industry with eminent
domain powers. Congress responded with the Cole Act which gave
the President the power to give pipeline companies a federal
privilege of eminent domain where it was necessary [23:618].
Despite knowledge that its tactics will not indefinitely
delay competition, the railroads have persisted in using this
old methodology. Its newest competitor, coal slurries, have not
been mentioned in the laws of most states or in the federal sta-
tues as an industry to which eminent domain has been accorded,
therefore the railroads have restricted their passage over rail-
road properties and rights-of-way.
No doubt the main reason for the railroads vehement op-
position is because the product to be carried is coal which has
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historically been a product which the rails have been able to
virtually monopolize in many areas. Coal has long been and re-
mains today the number one revenue producer for the Class I
railroads. In 1977, coal provided $2.7 billion as well as
nearly 3 percent of the tonnage originated [24:11] .
Because of the preeminent position that coal occupies in
its scheme of operations, the railroads through their national
organization, the American Association of Railroads (AAR) , have
mounted a large, well-funded program to oppose the growth of
coal slurries on all fronts and according to Bechtel Corporation
Vice-President H. M. McCamish, they (the railroads) "... are
quite frank in saying that they hope to forestall competition."
[2:5]
In the absence of rail crossing permits, the coal slur-
ries are effectively limited in their ability to acquire rights-
of-way across rail lines to any of three methods: federal emi-
nent domain legislation, state eminent domain legislation, and
judicial action. The slurry proponents, in an effort to employ
any of or all three of these methods, have united to form their
own spokesman group, The Slurry Transport Association (STA)
,
to combat the AAR. The STA is active in lobbying the cause of
slurryism in both Washington and at the state capitols of those
states where eminent domain is most urgently required. The
STA's court activities have been limited to witnessing [25:1].
Despite predating either the U. S. Constitution or any
of the original thirteen state constitutions, the concept of
eminent domain was not specifically mentioned in any of the early
documents although implied references exist as to its tenets in
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the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fifth Amendment
states in part that: "... nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." The Fourteenth
states that: "No state shall . . . deprive any person . . .
property . . . without due process of law." [26:538]
Whether the oversight of constitutional mention was
accidental or by devise can only be speculated. While several
interesting theories exist, they are beyond the scope of this
study. What can be said is that as the country expanded west-
ward, vigorous road, canal, and railroad building programs
quickly brought additional meaning to the concept. Since the power
existed strictly as an inherent right of the state and not as a
valid act of either Congress or a state legislature, arguments
quickly arose and a distinct branch of litigation was created
[27:266]
.
While a growing body of judicial interpretations ulti-
mately guided the application of eminent domain, a number of
states began to pass acts which specified the conditions of its
use, while other states began to make constitutional provisions
for its use. (See Appendix A) Originally, the courts ruled
that "public use" literally required the public's use. In the
early 18 00's, there was a gradual broadening of that concept
until "public use" was interpreted as "in the public's interest"
by the end of the century [27:266]. Interestingly, eminent do-
main became synonymous with common carriage since many common
carriers became the primary benefactors of its applications in
obtaining passageway for their modes [22:7]. As time passed
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a number of new industries, unheard of a hundred years ago,
have emerged and subsequently they too have been granted the
privilege of expropriation. Among them are natural gas pipe-
lines, telephone companies, electric utilities, airports, govern-
ment interest construction projects, and the like [26:528].
With the re-emergence of slurry technology as a viable
mode of transport has come a controversy regarding the use of
eminent domain as a means to facilitate its acquisition of rights-
of way. Naturally, those opposing the construction of slurries
state that the pipelines cannot serve as true common carriers
because of the restrictive nature of their customer selection
and service. Furthermore, they point out that coal pipelines
cannot fit within the context of "in the public interest" as it
has historically been interpreted by the courts. Notwithstanding,
the proponents of slurries argue that their pipelines can serve
as single-commodity common carriers much the same as oil and
natural gas pipelines do. In addition, these advocates state
that their pipelines are capable of furthering a public purpose
and that any private benefit derived from such activity is purely
incidental. To advance their argument, the slurry industry in
composite fashion formed the STA to:
. . . encourage the Congress of the United States
to extend the right of eminent domain to the coal
slurry pipelines so that the public may enjoy the
benefits of this economical technology and competi-
tion in the field of coal transportation. [25:1]
2 . Federal Legislation
At the federal level, legislation to grant eminent do-
main to the coal slurry pipeline was first introduced in 1962
by the Kennedy Administration. That bill, which would have
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triggered the building of a West Virginia to New York/New Jersey
pipeline by Consolidation Coal Co. (CONSOL) and Texas Eastern
Transmission Company (TETCO) , was defeated due to the opposition
of a number of powerful eastern railroads who saw their coal
transportation monopoly being threatened [28:36]. Not only
did the railroads succeed in blocking the Kennedy-sponsored
bill at the Federal level, they successfully rebuffed CONSOL and
TETCO at the state level, and ultimately bought CONSOL, the
developer, builder, and owner of the only active coal pipeline
at that time, out of the pipeline business by effecting a mas-
sive rate reduction in Coal District 8 on the condition that the
Cadiz line cease its operations. Although the rate reduction
was obviously in the short-term interests of CONSOL, the rail-
roads 1 aim was much more farsighted - to stifle the slurry concept
[29:34] .
And stifle they did; for it was twelve years before
another attempt was made for Federal legislation. In the wake
of the Arab oil embargo, when the need for this nation to develop
its most abundant and cheapest energy resource was most closely
highlighted to the general public, coal slurry legislation was
once again introduced. In the Senate, Senator Henry "Scoop"
Jackson's bill, S.2652, to give slurries condemnation rights
was quickly passed on a voice vote. From that time until present,
the Senate has been known to be in the slurry camp. Consequently,
the fight over Federal legislation has centered in the House of
Representatives [5:44].
House activity has not gone well for the slurry industry
over these past few years. A 197 4 House bill was referred to the
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Interior committee, where the railroads were able to obscure
the real issue and allow for the bill to die a slow death in
committee. The AAR was able to flex its muscles at this time
against a rather disorganized group of slurries proponents.
While 197 5 saw four new House bills and a series of lengthy
hearings, the powerful railroad lobby again was able to either
kill them or have them tabled while studies were required to
gather further information [3 0:24] .
In late 197 5, slurry proponents organized to create a
full-time lobby, the STA, which would fight the politically-
adept AAR. Disconcerted over its dismal results in the House
during 1975, the STA moved to hire W. Pat Jennings, the clerk of
the House of Representatives, as its president in hopes that his
influence would be helpful in overcoming the lethargy found in
the House Interior Committee [3 0:24]
.
As the debate wore on into 1977, two bills, The Coal
Transportation Act of 1977 (S. 1492) and The Coal Pipeline Act
of 1977 (H.R. 1609) , surfaced as a result of STA instigation.
Both were generating more testimony than ever before and both
appeared to be quite well-supported [31:6]. Before either bill
could pass, the AAR was successful in guiding Senator Lee Metcalf
(D., Montana) to request a study by the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) before further consideration would
be undertaken [31:6] . Unfortunately for the STA, the OTA study
took nearly a year longer than was originally forecasted and it
was January, 1978, before earnest activity was reinitiated on
either of the bills again.
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During the interim, a number of interesting and favorable
things happened for the STA. The Carter Administration endorsed
slurries and urged that the Department of Energy (DOE) be given
the power to grant certificates of eminent domain for coal slur-
ries [32:14]. Second, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),
fearful of losing control over an area of emergent transportation
regulation to DOE, indicated that slurries would be desirable in
the West and that it, the ICC, should be granted both certificate
and regulatory control over the industry [33:31]. Environmen-
talists, who had stood unified with the railroads as enemies of
the slurries, broke ranks and attacked railroads for their use
of unit trains [34:31]
.
These favorable events, coupled with growing industrial
and utility support for coal slurries, made the STA most optimis-
tic about its chances for success in 1978, but eminent domain was
not to be. Despite unqualified support in the House Interior
Committee and a vote of confidence from the Public Works and
Transportation Committee, a rift was opened in the House when the
Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Transportation sought to
have the bill referred to it. The Sub-Committee, known to be a
bastion of the AAR camp, was refused the right to review the bill
on jurisdictional grounds and it subsequently led an attack on
the bill which probably caused its defeat on the floor on July
19, 1978. As late as the morning of July 19th, an estimated
100 votes remained uncommitted on the eminent domain question,
but the outright opposition of House Commerce Committee's Chair-
man Harley Staggers (W.VA.), an outspoken railroad advocate,





Despite its setback, the STA is ready for another round.
Three more slurry bills, H.R. 10663, S. 707, and S. 3046, are
presently under review and slurry support is growing day by day.
Since the defeat in July, several events and legislative actions
have occurred which will heighten the STA's chances for success
in the immediate future. First, natural gas price controls have
been slightly loosened [35:3039]. Second, coal conversion
legislation which highly incentivized the construction of coal-
fired utilities and industrial plants and required conversion
of many existing plants from oil and natural gas to coal by 1990
was passed [35:3040] . Third, the OPEC countries called for a
substantial 1979 price increase [36:1] . Fourth, the flow of
Iranian oil has been curtailed for undetermined time [37:1].
Fifth, a number of utilities and industrial concerns have been
experiencing extreme difficulties with the railroads during
tariff negotiations [2:6].
3 . State Legislation
Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana all passed legislation
granting coal slurry lines the right of eminent domain in their
states during their 1977 legislative sessions [38 :V] . These
three states along with Arkansas, which has a constitutional
provision for granting eminent domain, and New Mexico, which has
yet to act, had earlier approved a resolution at a Southwest
Regional Council meeting of legislative leaders to "urge that
slurry pipelines be granted the right of eminent domain as
common carriers." [22:11]. This resolution was directed at each
of the five legislatures and at the U. S. Congress.
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Despite such success, some failures occurred in 1977.
Both in Nebraska, where an eminent domain bill died in committee,
and Kansas, where a bill was defeated, the slurry proponents
must regroup and try again. New legislation has been introduced
and is presently pending in each of these states. Despite vi-
gorous opposition, passage appears likely in both Nebraska and
Kansas in the near future [2:7] .
The bulk of the present efforts to obtain eminent domain
rights on behalf of slurries are being taken in the Far West
because all of the currently planned projects have been announced
for that area; however, earlier proposals had already caused some
legislative activity in the East. The Cadiz Line tested a 1952
Ohio law which had given slurries passage rights in that state
[22:10] . The proposed West Virginia line of the early 1960's
brought positive legislation in West Virginia in 1962, but at the
same time it cost slurry adovcates in Virginia where an existent
law which provided eminent domain authority was amended at rail-
road instigation to specifically disallow the exercise of the
authority by coal pipelines [39:124; 5:44].
The issue of eminent domain never arose in regards to
the Black Mesa Pipeline, owned oddly enough by a railroad com-
pany, the Southern Pacific. Several reasons may exist for this
break in character. First, the Black Mesa mines are located
over 100 miles from the nearest railhead and, secondly, because
the mountaineous terrain that the pipeline covers is not consid-
ered suitable for rail construction, the pipeline is not consid-
ered to be a direct competitor of the railroads [22:13] .
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As the scoreboard presently stands, there are ten states
which have definite legislation to grant expropriation rights to
coal slurries and another nine have enactments that probably would
support grants in their respective states, although judicial
tests would be required in each [2:7] . The number of states
supporting slurries becomes incidental, though, when an examination
is made as to the locational aspect of the states to the subject
pipelines. Slurry advocates have fought specifically to secure
legislative support in those states concentrated along the
routes of the planned pipelines. Exhibit 10 depicts those
states which presently support slurry legislation.
It is now possible to see that many of the pipelines
can now or will be able in the near future to begin construction
without fear of right-of-way entaglements . For example, the shor-
ter of the two Alton Lines could be built entirely within Utah,
while the longer one would have only a short 18-mile run into
Nevada, which might not present any problems since the Black Mesa
was able to transverse it successfully. The San Marco has com-
plete eminent domain coverage for its long distance line, al-
though its feeder line from New Mexico would remain questionable
without some action. The Wytex could be built by use of a
Colorado corridor. The ETSI also could use a Colorado route,
but that is unlikely since ETSI has now established its route
through Nebraska and Kansas by use of the court system. Of
the two remaining pipelines, the Northwest proposal is relatively
inactive and therefore state legislation was not sought; and the





when the selected route is announced, some aggressive action
to secure rights-of-way will be undoubtedly required.
4 . Judicial Decision
To date, only one coal slurry line has sought to use
the judicial system to strike down its opponents. That line,
the ETSI, has persistently challenged the legality of railroad
impediments along its entire route. In setting a precedent in
July 1977, U.S. District Court Judge Clarence A. Brimmer
(Wyoming) ruled that ETSI's line could pass under the Union
Pacific's tracks despite the railroad's claim that the 18 62
Pacific Railroads Act gave it control over the subsurface of
its 400-foot rights-of-way. Brimmer disagreed with the rail-
road, stating that the rights pertaining to the substructure
remained with the Federal government [16] . Since the Brimmer
decision, which ETSI hailed as a significant step forward, the
pipeline company has won 66 more cases involving railroad ob-
struction. From a right-of-way perspective, the ETSI is presently
prepared to begin construction [17:7],
B. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN
Environmental ism, born of fear in the late 1950' s, became an
issue of resounding public sentiment in the late 1960's. Alarm-
ist tendencies, whipped by the environmentalist movement, made
the state of the environment an issue of popular concern. Mem-
bership in both older clubs, such as the Sierra Club, and newer,
more militant groups like Friends of the Earth was increasing.
In response to growing concern, Congress established the Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) within the Presidnet's Executive
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Office in 1969 to study the state of the environment and recom-
mend a course of action to be followed in upgrading it. In
197 0, the CEQ laid out an extensive environmental agenda, which
when articulated by President Nixon established 37 goals for
his administration [40:101].
At the turn of the decade, environment was synonymous with
politics. Not only was President Nixon attempting to capitalize
on the synergistic effects of the movement, but so was Senator
Ed Muskie, the leading Democratic candidate for the Presidency.
Muskie was an outspoken proponent of 'Earth Day." Held April 22,
197 0, Earth Day was set aside to demonstrate that millions of
Americans were upset about environmental degradation. Acclaimed
by its proponents as a hugh public relations success, "Earth
Day" brought the widest media coverage to the environmentalist
movement that it had ever enjoyed [4 0:101]
.
Riding the crest of their movement, environmentalists con-
tinued to force change throughout the first of the early 1970* s.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was created in October
1970, under a Presidential Reorganization Plan approved by Con-
gress. EPA's creation centralized nearly 6000 employees from
fifteen other agencies to coordinate America ' s attack on pollu-
tion. In unifying the forces for research, monitoring, standard-
establishment, and enforcement, it was thought that the EPA
would become America's guardian of the environment, a watchdog
to ensure that pollution control would become an integral system
in the American Scheme of Life [4 0:102]
.
Six areas of pollution control were placed under the juris-
diction of the EPA through various legislative mandates and
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nearly all of these areas have had an impact, either directly
or indirectly, upon the proposed coal slurry pipelines. These
areas are water pollution, air pollution, solid waste, pesti-
cides, radiation, and noise. In addition to these general
areas, a number of other lesser concerns have been aired because
of either the persistent efforts of naturalists or the require-
ment for full disclosure of environmental impact whenever a
project is proposed under various state and federal statues
[40:102] .
The primary piece of legislation affecting industry is the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) which created the CEQ
in 1969. Although much amended, this act provides for the basic
framework under which environmental policy is established and
how it is administered. It specifies the procedural steps in
submitting data for Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) . As
stated earlier in regards to Alton pipelines, EIS data submission
is a sensitive issue not only to the coal slurry industry, but also
to the utility industry as well [41:133] In fact, last June
14, when the EPA announced that a plan from Montana Power Co.
for the construction of two coal-fired plants was being rejected
because the utility had not used more advanced pollution-control
equipment, the utility was appalled because the standards requir-
ing this action had only been authorized under the Clean Air
Act of 1977 while the submitted plans were much older [42]
.
Because legislation at the Federal level has preemptive
authority over the statues of any state under the supremacy
clause of the Constitution, this discussion will parallel Federal
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Law, although it is worthy of note that many states, especially
those in the Rocky Mountains, the Northern Great Plains, the
Great Southwest, and to a lesser extent the Southeast, also
have quite rigid statues which in many cases, because of their
more restrictive nature, take precedence or at least dominate
the action of industrial suitors [43] . For example, in Montana,
a series of laws restricting the use of water for energy de-
velopment, prohibiting entirely the disposal of certain efflu-
ents in any manner, and severely regulating the strip-mining
of coal have been passed in the past five years [44]
.
The Clean Air and Clean Water Acts of 197 and 1972,
respectively, jointly sponsored by Senator Ed Muskie (D-ME)
,
provided that the EPA establish, monitor, and enforce air and
water quality standards and emission or discharge regulations
throughout the country. Under the air mandate, the country was
divided into several regions for air quality, and standards
were set depending on the pre-existent quality of air in each of
those regions. Similarly, regions were required for the improve-
ment of water conditions not only by the 197 2 Act but also by
its precursors relating to water quality in 1962 and 1965 [41:130]
Both the Clean Air Act of 197 and its companion, the Clean
Water Act of 197 2, were updated in 1977 by the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts of 1977. These subsequent amendments generally
stiffened the EPA's stringent requirements for industry to
achieve; however, both Acts expanded the time-frames for abso-
lute compliance with the toughened standards [45:4; 46:2].
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The Clean Air Act of 19 7 had a general debilitating effect
on the coal industry. An industry-wide slump was in progress
at that time of its passage and that slump continued into 1971
[47:19; 48:72]. The tight regulations set by the EPA with re-
gard to sulfur pollutants created an immediate problem for all
coal users. Electric utilities which derived 80 percent of all
generating capacity from coal-fired units at that time suddenly
found that coal was an environmental public enemy [49:1-5-1].
In New York City, the Mayor-elect, John Lindsay, stated his ad-
ministration would seek to ban the use of coal by Consolidated
Edison Co. (ConEdison) which used coal to provide for 4 percent
of the city's requirements [50:22].
As utilities began to turn away from coal, rather than try
to attempt to meet the EPA standards, nuclear generation in-
creasingly became the answer. Originally scheduled only to
double from its 1964 capacity of 100 megawatts (mw) by 197 0,
nuclear generation exploded to 98,520 mw of capacity and fore-
casts were revised to indicate another doubling of 197 0'
s
capacity by 1980. The revised 1990 estimate called for 475,000
mw according to the Federal Power Commission (FPC) . The Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) exhibited more optimism in stating that
capacity would be 500,000 mw [49:1-6-1). In essence, nuclear
generation began to supplant coal as the fuel of the future.
The FPC estimated that by 19 90 coal generation would account for
only 44 percent of power requirements and most of that capacity
would be from the existing plants that abound today [4 9:1-5-1]
.
While the preceding projections appeared to be holding true
for the first five years of this decade, the fickle finger of
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environmentalists twitched about until it came to rest on the
dangers of the nuclear energy. During the interim between coal's
turn on the environmentalist hot seat and nuclear energy's, this
nation had endured both the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 and the
natural gas shortage of 1975. The Federal government had turned
its crisis mentality from the environment to a new and growing
monster, the energy crisis. New headlines pervaded the media;
although environment was nd: a forgotten subject, it was second
page news. After all, the quality of both the air and water
was dramatically improved. According to Senator Muskie, "9 0%
of the nation's industries" were on target in meeting federally
imposed standards for water discharges, [45:4]. The EPA even pro-
posed the softening of pollution rules for all but the largest
industries [51:2] . Likewise, the quality of the air was much
improved, such that talk of simultaneous coal development and
environmental strategies was virtually unopposed by the major
environmentalist lobbies.
As this trend took hold, the Carter Administration began
its long fight for a National Energy Bill. The Department of
Energy (DOE) was created and the "moral equivalent of war" was
declared by President Carter [52], The National Energy Plan
(NEP) proposed by the administration called for a doubling of
the coal production by 1985. America's route to energy indepen-
dence, at least in the short-term, was to be coal development
[53:63] . Although this policy was endorsed by several studies,
most notably those of the National Petroleum Council, the Work-
shop on Alternate Strategies, and Project Independence, a grass-
roots movement, was needed to overcome the political realities of
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overt environmental! sm [54; 55; 56 ].
On March 2, 1971, the Department of Energy (DOE) published a
notice in The Federal Register requesting the comments of the
general public on the issues of: (1) prioritizing various energy
development options; and (2) ranking of those development options
in relation for their potential to cause environmental harm. A
total of 27,8 98 responses (18,721 from individuals and 9,177
from groups) were received and the summarized results are shown
in Table II. This public opinion poll ranked coal as the most
favored option for energy development and also showed that nu-
clear development was far and away the most feared form of de-
velopment from the standpoint of its potential for damaging the
environment [57:26/7].
The published results of DOE ' s Public Opinion Study revealed
several anomolies when compared to the recent past. Using Exhibit
11 created from data in the DOE study, which presents a com-
posite review of the various states' relative strengths either in
support of or against strong environmentalist stands relative to
energy development, it is found that in both Kansas and Nebraska,
where environmentalist concern has led to the defeat of eminent
domain legislation, that the DOE response statistics indicate the
populace is in theory aligned with the energy development camp.
Conversely, in the Rock Mountains, the Southwest, and the South-
east, where the pro-coal energy forces are headquartered, the DOE
study revealed paradoxical information. While these truisms may
be indicative of a general bias found in the DOE survey, it is
probably more likely that a specific bias occurred in which the




RESPONSES TO DOE QUESTIONNAIRE
IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION: WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ENERGY
SOURCES PRESENTS THE GREATEST RISK TO THE ENVIRONMENT? [57:26]
12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
COAL 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
OIL 6 5 3 4 3 3 2 4 4
GAS 8 7 4 5 3- 3 2 4 4
NUCLEAR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HYDROELECTRIC 5 4 3 5 3 3 2 3 4
SOLAR 3 3 4 3 2 3 2 3 3
GEOTHERMAL 7 6 3 4 3 3 2 4 4
OTHER 4 5 3 4 2 3 2 3 4
IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION: IN WHAT PRIORITY SHOULD THE
FOLLOWING ENERGY RESOURCES BE DEVELOPED? [57:27]
7 8
COAL 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
OIL 5 5 5 5 5 6 8 6 5
GAS 7 8 6 7 8 7 7 8 8
NUCLEAR 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
HYDROELECTRIC 6 6 5 6 6 4 4 5 6
SOLAR 3 3 3 3 1 2 2 1 2
GEOTHERMAL 8 7 7 8 7 8 6 7 7
OTHER 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4
COLUMN DESIGNATIONS:
1. CONSENSUS 6. GOVERNMENT
2. GENERAL PUBLIC 7. LABOR
3. BUSINESS 8, EDUCATION
4. INDUSTRY 9. OTHER





for energy development or for environmental protection was
largely a matter of the perceived imminence that the respon-
dents felt toward the possibility of either of these develop-
ments affecting their particular regions.
While the EPA has guarded the public from pollution, the DOE,
through its Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA) has
been tasked independently to explicitly develop a number of new
energy options and the means to transport the energy. While
these goals appear to be in conflict, ERDA has as a primary goal,
the development and commercialization of any and all of these
technologies in such a manner as
:
. . . to protect and improve the Nation ' s environ-
mental quality by assuring that the preservation of
land, water, and air resources is given high
priority. [58:5-1]
In support of the coal option, a supporting technology field
which ERDA is attempting to develop has been fossil fuel trans-
portation. This generic area contains a number of options in-
cluding coal slurry pipelines, railroads, barge, and extra
high voltage (EHV) transmission [58:5-7].
With the emphasis back toward coal as a major fuel, coal
slurry lines have taken on additional meaning as a viable mode
of transportation. Due to the anti-coal attitudes of the early
1970's, there was little interest in supporting the emergent
slurry proposals; but with the resurgence of interest in coal,
a heightened level of attention to slurries has been observed.
Among the interested are the environmentalists because slurries
appear to be more environmentally sound than some of the other
transportation options. Despite the appearnace of a developing
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relationship, the environmentalists and slurrymen remain far
from friends because a number of questions remain to be answered
conclusively.
While a number of utilities had turned to Western coal as a
means to meet the EPA imposed standards of the Clean Air Act
of 197 0/ the 1977 amendments to the Act effectively prohibited
these actions by requiring that all power plants employ the
latest available technology in meeting the standards [59:2],
The EPA followed this action by tightening its air quality emis-
sion standards by 8 5 percent in September of 1978 [60:12] . How-
ever, the EPA noted some modifications could be made to relax this
requirement for plants using low-sulfur western coals [61:6].
EPA'S tightening of its standards, under the auspices of best
available technology, followed significant advancements in
scrubber technology [62:8]. Scrubbers, devices to clean sulfur
pollutants from coal emissions, have evolved significantly enough
to eliminate 8 5 percent of the pollutants from high-sulfur East-
ern coals, although it has yet to be shown that it can economically
be applied to plants using low-sulfur coal which the proposed
slurries would transport. [61:6]. Another technology which ap-
pears to be influencing the EPA's action is the development on
two new portable spectrometers by the Naval Research Laboratory
(NRL) to determine the amount of sulfur pollutants in the atmosphere
and the degree of existent health hazard derived from those pol-
lutants [63 : 8] .
The demand for low-sulfur coal has caused 17 states and
several Canadian provinces to begin using Wyoming coal. Predic-
tions call for another eleven-fold increase in its use by the
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year 2 000 [64:79] . Since the railroads in that area are
nearly 100 percent utilized at present, and barge use is im-
practical because of the lack of navigable waterways, other
options have been explored. Although EHV transmission net-
works have been considered a plausible option, they also have
been considered unduly expensive, while the slurry options
have been warmly received by both coal producers and users of
Wyoming and other Western coals [65:11]
.
The slurry advocates, dormant for a decade, had come back in
the mid-1970 's with proposal after proposal. Although the
previous section on eminent domain indicated that the rail-
roads had attempted to delay slurry construction, it should be
noted that the environmentalists through the EPA, have actually
slowed slurry activity as much as any group. Although the ef-
fects are inadvertent, a number of Federal statues have proven
to be major hurdles for slurry projects. The National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements for providing environ-
mental impact data have become a time-consuming ordeal. In
fact, if the protracted delays that Nevada Power have reported
regarding the Alton Lines is indicative of the future, then any
new slurries will be significantly affected by NEPA, because
slurries cannot avoid EIS. Under the NEPA, EIS is required for
projects which: (1) cross Federal lands; (2) cross "waters of
the U.S."; (3) discharge pollutants into waters; and (4) are
part of the transportation element of a Mine Plan for the
development of a Federal Coal lease [38:133].
Impacts considered by NEPA include both those created by
construction or operations. Some of the more notable construction
6 4

impacts are: (1) disruption of fish migration paths while
streams are diverted for construction purposes, (2) destruction
of habitat for ecosystems due to vegetation removal during
construction, (3) increased dust due to traffic of construction
equipment, (4) increased fire hazards due to presence of man,
(5) aesthetic value of the land is temporarily reduced, (6)
noise increased temporarily, (7) possible erosion hazards cre-
ated because of land cuts to meet grade requirements, and (8)
recreational activities could be disrupted. Operational impact
on the environment is generally caused in only one way by a coal
slurry line, and that is due to rupture. Even a small leak at
the high pressures used in slurry technology will quickly develop
into a major break [41:109-114]. Because only one such rupture
has ever occurred, the effects of such spills can only be specu-
lated since knowledge regarding that spill is limited. While it
is known that the quantity of the spill would depend upon the
flow rate, pressure, depth of the pipe, characteristics of the
overburden, time of the detection, etc., speculation can only
be offered as to the environmental effect. It is believed that
damage to the environment resulting from a spill would not be
severe, although the effect of the coal sludge on plant growth or
aquatic life cannot be projected. An immediate concern in any
spill would result if toxic corrosion inhibitors are being used
to protect the pipelines. Some chemical additives could poison
animal life or contaminate community drinking waters in the
event of a spill [66:16].
The potential for industrial spills into "waters of the
United States" has prompted the enactment of two laws. The
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first, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)
,
pro-
hibits the accidental or purposeful discharge of any industrial
effluent which may contain toxic or hazardous substances into the
surface waters of the United States without a permit. Likewise,
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) protects underground sources
by eliminating the use of either underground injections or unsealed
dump ponds as methods for liquid waste disposal when the waste
contains either toxic or hazardous substances [41:13 0]. Viola-
tions of either of these laws carries a substantial penalty for
both the offending corporation and its officers. Although nei-
ther of these laws has caused any concern to date, the potential
for conflict abounds because of the Clean Water amendments of
1977. Essentially, that legislation adds a provision for new
non-conventional pollutants to be categorized by the EPA and
added to its toxic or hazardous substance list. Such additions
could cause an impact for coal slurries, since coal is known
to carry a multitude of. organic riders which may be leached by
slurry effluents [66:16].
Slurry effluent at the Black Mesa complex is presently being
used as makeup water for the cooling tower at the Mojave gener-
ating plant. The effluent is cooled, settled, treated, and then
mixed with five parts fresh water before being consumed at the
cooling tower. All the effluent has been effectively used with
no proven environmental impact. It is considered feasible that
this type of system will be employed at the utily termini for
all the presently proposed slurry lines [67] . If slurries are
eventually built to service coal exporting terminals or indus-
tries which would not use large cooling towers, then some
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rethinking on effluent usage will be in order [68:10]
.
While the detractors of coal slurry lines point to its use
of scarce water (discussed in section 4 of this chapter) , its
damage potential if a spill were to occur, and its temporary con-
struction impact, the slurrymen scoff and point with pride to
their record. The Ohio and Black Mesa pipelines have provided
16 years of operational experience and no evidence of environ-
mental impact can be shown. The lines are buried, quiet, and
present no air, water, or radiation hazards. There is no fire
danger nor is the slurry in itself considered toxic. Slurrymen
note that none of the other modes of transportation can match
it [69:5.23]. ETSI, purveyor of the most controversial pipeline,
usually pairs the social ills of rail lines with its environmental
arguments by advising people that its pipeline would replace
2500 unit trains of coal each year or one every hour and fourty-
five minutes, day and night, 3 65 days per year [7 0:8] . In a small
town like Lusk, Wyoming, that type of talk is understood. There
the town is bisected by one of the two main lines running out of
the Powder River Basin coal fields and it is predicted that during
the 198 0' s at least 50 units trains per day will cut the town in
half. Every half-hour, day and night, trains averaging 100 cars
in length will rumble through the town with all of the attendant
social problems of trains [71:12].
The "environmental issue" appears to be one that the coal
slurry has in hand. The big problem in the environmental area
is to ensure that coal remains a powerful energy alternative,
since previous research has already shown that coal-fired power
plants present a significantly more serious threat to the
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ecological subsystems around them than do either unit trains
or coal slurry pipelines [72:24].
C. THE RAIL SLURRY COMPETITION ISSUES
The American railroad industry has been the enemy of coal
slurry pipelines from the first day that the Cadiz line proved
successful. CONSOL had originally begun the development of
slurry data to combat the rising cost of rail transport. During
the course of CONSOL 's efforts, the railroads, among others,
looked on with interest. The futility of CONSOL' s project was
widely recognized and probably best summed up by a Coal Age
magazine article in 1951:
. . . for a good many years to come, the bulk of coal
shipments will doubtless continue on moving by rail - not
because it is cheaper - but because it would take a long
time and lots of money to build another transportation net-
work that would equal the railroads. [73]
Notwithstanding such ominous forecasts, CONSOL persisted in
its investigation until in 1957 four of its researchers patented
a coal slurry transport system [7 4] . Within a year, the Cadiz
pipeline was in operation and the local railroads were feeling
its effect. Competition required action, and as previously
stated, the railroads responded with significant rate conces-
sions to force the retirement of the pipeline [75:92].
The rail industry has not forgotten the lesson of competi-
tion from Cadiz. The lesson brought back many of the bitter
memories faced by the industry during its decline in the twenti-
eth century [7 6] . First, the pipelines and water traffic had
cut into rail revenues, then it was the motor industry, and
finally air transport had done its damage. The rail industry,
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through its organized voice, the American Association of Rail-
roads (AAR) , was determined not to he humbled by another com-
petitor - at least, not without a fight [31:20]
.
The struggle between railmen and slurrymen has now worn on
for over two decades. Their disagreement has been multifaceted,
and as noted in the background chapter, there have been substan-
tial differences of opinion even as to matters of fact. An
area rich in conflict has been the one involving the supposed
impact of slurries upon the railroads. This area is quite per-
vasive because a large number of sub-issues provide its structure.
Because the sub-issues range from conflict over which mode uses
the most energy to which one most gainfully employs steel, this
discussion must necessarily be limited to the most basic sub-
issues. The following issues will be examined: (1) the issue of
need, (2) the competition issue, and (3) the economics issue.
1 . The Issue of Need
Ever since President Carter's call for the doubling of
coal production on April 20, 1977, there has been a considerable
amount of speculation as to whether or not the coal industry
could respond to such pressures [77:15] . Only the General
Accounting Office (GAO) emphatically stated that attainment of
such a lofty goal was impractical and unlikely [69:1]. A great
number of other projections have indirectly refuted the Presi-
dent's projection by quoting lower production estimates through
1985. While no consensus of opinion exists as to how many tons
of coal will be produced, it is hypothesized that the actual
amount would fall somewhere between the Edison Electric Institute's
estimate of 77 9 million tons and the Bureau of Mines' approximation
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of 988 million tons [69;ii] . Using these estimates as the
practical upper and lower bounds of coal production, an issue
of conflict has arisen over whether slurries (or other modes)
are required or whether the railroads can handle the increased
traffic requirements. This sub-issue is the issue of need.
Even under a reduced scenario, a question exists as to
the railroads 1 ability to handle the higher traffic demands.
Historically the railroads have been a capital intensive indus-
try. When cars were short, more were purchased. Because of the
relative ease with which cars were added, the railroads accorded
only lip service to complaints regarding car shortages [78:2].
Whenever complaints were severe, the railroads' ploy was to in-
troduce a new nation-wide system which was to solve the problems.
First, there were car service rules, then per diem systems, and
finally Automatic Car Identification (ACI) . None of the systems
worked. In the recent past has come the Train II system, but
despite its sophistication, car shortages persist. The rail
industry explains on the one hand that despite the best of sys-
tems, localized car shortages are apt to occur; yet on the other,
the industry insists that they have no problems in meeting the
expanding requirements of the coal industry [66:18]. The Na-
tional Coal Association (NCA) has taken umbrage with the AAR's
thinking. According to its President, Carl E. Bagge, the coal
industry requires slurries. He adamantly contests the rail-




Long haul coal movements of western railroads
have shown that a minimum of 4 000 coal cars
are required to move 2 5 million tons of coal
under the unit train concept. With the minimum
potential increase in coal of 3 00 million tons of
coal over the decade, the railroads will need an ad-
ditional 48000 cars and 2400 locomotives. In addi-
tion replacements to maintain their hauling capacity,
they will require 3 9200 more hopper cars and 1960
additional locomotives. With the aforementioned
financing problems, the NCA doubts that the rail-
roads can keep pace to 1985, let along beyond
that period in time [7 9:31]
.
A growing number of utilities have found that the only
way to ensure that the railroads will have cars for their unit
trains is to buy and maintain their own cars. Pennsylvania
Power and Light (PP&L) pioneered the use of privately-owned cars
for unit train operations in 1963 and since that time the concept
has grown tremendously. At least 25 utilities are now employing
well over 16,500 owned or leased cars [80:29] . Because Houston
Lighting and Power, Portland General Electric, and Wisconsin
Electric Power have all placed recent orders totaling 17 8 2 cars,
it is anticipated that the use of prinvately-owned cars will
continue to enjoy expanded use [81:3 0]
.
Despite the lack of optimism demonstrated by the users
of rail transport, a number of studies have indicated that the
railroads can handle the predicted growth. The Bureau of Mines
confirmed that "the capacity of the railroads to cope with sub-
stantially more western coal does not seem to be an unduly
serious matter." [82;19] A study performed by Hudson Institute
noted that
:
Railroads should be able to meet initial requirements
with little effort and, given investment in cars and
motive power, should be able to increase haulage as
fast as mines can increase production. [83:36]
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A study prepared for the Federal Energy Administration by Peat,
Marwick, and Mitchel indicated that the rail industry would
have no difficulty in acquiring the equipment it needed under
any of three different scenarios, one of which assumed a far
greater coal production that has now been anticipated [84:vii].
A report prepared for the Department of Transportation (DOT)
predicted that "anticipated coal traffic increases, even though
affecting individual railroads unevenly, would not place (an)
unmanageable strain on rail capacity." [8 5:45]
Unfortunately, there are no official comprehensive
estimates of railroad network capacity from which judgments can
be made. While all of the above studies adjudge the adequacy
of the rail system to be sound, other studies can be found to
refute them. A study prepared for the Federal Railroad Admini-
stration states:
The ability of rail lines to absorb considerable
increase in traffic without major change must be
questioned. Line capacity was found to be consid-
erably less than widely believed. . . Delays ge-
nerally exceed acceptable limits. . . [86].
An Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report
states
:
Based on our estimates ... we have found that
there are a number of critical locations on the
railroad network which cannot handle the projected
1985 traffic. In a sentence, for many public utili-
ties, which may be dependent on coal by 1985, there
is legitimate concern that the transportation system
(all modes) may not be able to carry the coal over
the most direct, lowest cost routes. [87:71].
These last two references are the type which catch the
eyes of coal primaries, suppliers and users. A number of pri-
maries believe that railroads cannot cope with the future alone.
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Among the primaries so inclined are the National Association
of Electric Companies, the Rural Electric Cooperatives, and the
American Public Power Association. Without a continuous, unin-
terrupted flow of coal, public utilities know that their future
operations will be jeopardized. It is in their best interest to
look for secure modes of transportation and in great numbers
they are turning to coal slurry pipelines. The National Coal
Association, the suppliers, and public utilities, the users,
all appear to realize that the issue of need is settled in favor
of coal slurry pipelines.
2. The Competitive Issue
"Competition is the spice of life," goes an old adage.
In America, it has become a way of life. Competitive rivalry
is no stranger to the transportation industries; in fact, it
aided the rail industry in establishing itself. The story of
The Tom Thumb , Peter Cooper's little engine, racing with a small
grey horse from Ellicott's Mills to Baltimore in 183 is probably
as well known today as when it first happened. Had it not been
for the Tom Thumb '
s
performance, a railroad network might not
have evolved as early as it did in this country [76:2]. Despite
the importance of competition to the railroad's past, they now
question its morality when used againsta regulated industry.
Somewhere the spirit of competition has become a dead
virtue in rail transportation. Whether it happened to the rail-
roads during the cartel period, the trust era, during nationaliza-
tion, or since the depression can only be speculated. The fact
is that the competitive nature is no longer there. Today, profit
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margins, rates of return, the building or the abandonment of
lines and countless' other areas are all regulated. No deviations
are tolerated; cars are traded, rates are joined, and tracks are
shared. Internal competition just has not proven to be the
spice of railroad life and it appears that the railroad industry
is just one big happy family.
Many believe that the construction of coal slurry pipe-
lines would stimulate the railroads' interest in providing better
service and in reducing price. In an editorial, the Tulsa Tri-
bune stated that "Transportation that costs more than it needs
to cost is a tax against the ultimate consumer." Craig McNeese,
the Vice-President of Houston Lighting and Power (HLP) , testified
before the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands and Resources on
May 25, 1978, that:
We believe that the situation (high rail tariffs)
faced by HLP could be entirely different were there
a viable coal slurry pipeline industry in operation
today. For coal slurry pipelines would provide (for)
an alternate form of transportation that at the very
least would create a competitive incentive for the
establishment of more realistic rates by the railroads.
[88]
The rail industry rebuts their critics by claiming that
competition does exist. They claim that they compete as well
as cooperate with other railroads and barge lines. According to
a Burlington Northern (BN) pamphlet on competition:
Utilities and other major coal users have a choice of
suppliers as well as carriers. This vigorous competition
will remain as long as the present modes and mines are
not shut out by coal slurry pipelines and their long
term take or pay contacts. 18 9]
The President of the AAR, William Dempsey, adds, "...
railroads are true common carriers." The railroads cannot set
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rates arbitrarily and declare that their customers must accept
the rates or do without service. The customer has the right of
appeal to the Interstate Commerce Commission whenever it senses
that a railroad has set an unfair rate [90]
.
While the railroad community can point with alacrity to
such statements, there appears to be little substance to their
promises of choice. For instance, in the now famous San Antonio
rate case, BN quoted HLP a rate of $7.90 a ton to move coal from
Gillette, Wyoming, to San Antonio subject to annual adjustments.
Subsequently, HLP signed a twenty-year agreement with its sup-
pliers whereupon it was notified by BN that because of an unpre-
cedented increase in costs, a charge of $11.37 would be required.
These charges were then adjusted upward to $11.94 in November,
1978. HLP appealed, ICC Docket #3 6190, and the rate was subse-
quently reset at $10.93, whereupon BN sued the ICC. Although the
8th District Court of Appeals refused to hear the case, the issue
did not stop. BN filed for a new increase to $18.23 per ton which
was contested before the ICC by the HLP. Subsequently the rate
was reduced, but not enough to satisfy HLP which filed suit for
further relief [91] . A similar case involving BN and HLP has
also developed over the rates between Gillette and Houston [92:3].
In a speech to Congress in 1977, President Carter stated,
"I happen to believe in competition, and we don't have enough
of it right now." In regard to transportation alternatives he
is probably right, however one degree of consideration must be
made in the railroads' case. As a common carrier, it could not
challenge a coal pipeline with its long-term contract coverage.
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Through the use of a long-term "take-or-pay" contract, the
slurry effectively locks up its customer for 20, 25, or 3
years. President Dempsey of the AAR says: "No railroad can win
back the traffic lost to a pipeline. . . not by cutting rates,
not through innovations, not by any means. There cannot be competi-
tion when the so-called competitors operate under different and
unequal rules." [90:7]
3 . The Economics Issue
During the period from 1925 to 197 0, the electric power
industry was able to decrease electric rates to residential
customers by 7 percent while the consumer price index rose by
nearly 500 percent. This remarkable performance on the part of
the utilities was due mostly to their improvements in efficiencies
while the price of fuel remained stable. Since 197 0, the pace of
technological advancements have slowed and fuel costs have soared.
Utilities have sought ways to reduce fuel costs and many have
looked squarely at their transportation costs which have run
as high as 7 percent of the delivered cost of fuel. For this
reason, a number of utilities are hailing the use of coal slurry
lines as essential [2:11].
According to the Congressional testimony of F. W. Lewis,
President of Mid-South Utilities, he expects to save and pass
on to the consumers of the area served by the ETSI pipeline a
savings of $14 billion over the next 30 years [93:37]. Similar
testimony from Howard Cowen, a former Vice-President of the
Oklahoma Public Service Corporation, indicated a $12 billion
savings could be delivered in his home state if the Wytex Line
was operational today [34:32] ..
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Although a number of studies have been performed to
demonstrate that neither of the two methods can be considered
unequivocally superior in all instances to the other, several
general advantages can be noted in the slurry's favor. First,
it offers a definite economy of scale benefit. They are economi-
cally efficient for moving large volumes of coal over long dis-
tances for long periods of time. This advantage has been passed
to the consumers served by the Mojave Power Station which is
supplied by the Black Mesa Pipeline. Officials of Southern
California Edison estimate that they have saved and passed on
to their customers nearly 5 percent of the cost that would have
been required had they taken the rail alternative. [77:3] The
second general advantage enjoyed by slurries is their capital in-
tensiveness. Once the pipeline is installed, 7 percent of its
cost remains fixed for thelife time of the line. By contrast
only 50 percent of the rails' costs are fixed. For this reason,
the pipeline remains relatively insensitive to escalation from
inflation and most customers prepared to sign long-term contracts
are extremely happy with such an inflationary hedge [77:3].
As previously mentioned, a number of studies have drawn
upon hypothetical cases to show that in some cases rail is superior
from a cost standpoint to slurry. Likewise, a number of studies
show that on an equal basis, slurry is superior in certain cases
to rail. Most studies, however, are inconclusive. The notable
and recent .study of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
declared where rail lines previously existed, the rail option is
often superior and where the distance becomes a factor, the slurry
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tends to dominate [41] . Unfortunately, none of the current
studies have attempted to analyze the situation which existed
shortly after construction of the Black Mesa Pipeline (BMP)
and the Black Mesa and Lake Powell Railroad (BM&LP) . Although
the BMP and the BM&LP were not direct competitors, they represent
the only real comparable sets of data that presently exist.
While only a crude comparison can be made, its importance is
significant since it can be abstracted from actual rather than
hypothetical data [94:69].
BM&LP was a 78-mile rail line built between Black Mesa
and the Navajo Generating Station near Lake Powell on the Arizona-
Utah border. Designed to operate automatically, BM&LP was to
remain in constant motion 24 hours a day, six days a week. The
computer-controlled line employed the most advanced rail technology
available in 1974. Its rails were continuously welded, its ties
were of concrete, and its cars were especially designed over-
sized, bottom-dump models that enhanced the rapid delivery capa-
bilities advertised by its builder, Morrison-Knudsen. The un-
manned engines were to pull the trains at approximately 25 MPH
between Black Mesa and Lake Powell, slowing only at terminals to
allow for loading and unloading at one-half mile per hour. After
gliding through the terminals, the trains would again speed on
towards its next destination. The total cost for the BM&LP
system was slightly over $54 million.
The results of the BM&LP experiment indicates that the
train's automatic controls failed and that a three-man crew was
required to manually override the computer-operated systems.
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The concrete ties began to chip and crack under the tremendous
weight of the oversized 122-ton cars. In an effort to de-
celerate the rate of wear that it was enduring, the BM&LP reduced
the load factor for its cars by 25 percent. Although the rail-
road attempted to sell the cars, there were no takers. According
to H. C. Voepel, the Assistant Superintendent of the Navajo
Plant: "Looking at the economics of pulling all that dead weight,
you could justify throwing the cars away." [94:69] Ultimately,
that action was taken and 100-ton cars were purchased to replace
the oversized ones. Minimal repairs were made to the trackage
at a cost of $10 million even though Morrison-Knudsen Co.
stated a $20 million overhaul was needed to replace the con-
crete ties
.
To formulate a rough comparison, consider that the BMP at
273 miles in length carried 4.5 million tons of coal in its first
year or a total of 1228.5 million ton miles at a total capital
cost of $3 9 million plus operating costs. Meanwhile, the BM&LP
carried 90 tons of coal per car, 100 cars per train, 3 times per
day, six days per week over a 78-mile course, for a total of 657
million ton miles at a cost of $64 million plus operating costs.
Even if operating costs were considered to be equal, which they
probably were not considering BM&LP problems, then the slurry
exhibited a .0317<=/ton mile compared to . 0974£/ton mile advantage
over the BM&LP railroad. Another advantage enjoyed by BMP as well
was the near perfect material condition of its pipeline in comparison




Of all of the issues affecting coal slurries, probably the most
emotional one is water. A rather new Wyoming adage, "Water tends
to flow in the general direction of money," cynically refers to
the state's granting of a provisional water permit to ETSI in
1974. The permit would allow ETSI to use up to 20,000 acre feet
of water per year from the Madison aquifer for the next thirty
years. Many people, including a number of South Dakota residents,
were extremely perturbed over Wyoming's action. William Janklow,
then Attorney General and presently Governor of South Dakota,
said that, "The water belongs to everyone, but he who gets there
first should have first crack at it. Our communities and farmers
have been here for years. . . " [95:Al]
One would hope that emotion would not guide the decisions
which could inevitably effect the lives of countless numbers of
Americans but there is little chance of that. Westerners typi-
cally have used the "fastest gun" approach in allocating their
water supplies. Because of this characteristic, it has been
rather easy for the opponents of coal slurries, in particular,
for the railroads, to stir the emotional tide against slurries.
This is especially so in the Northern Great Plains Region where
the annual rainfall is limited to 10 to 12 inches and, unfortunate-
ly for slurry proponents, where three of the largest proposed
pipelines originate [2; 9].
Coal slurries do require massive amounts of water and a
general consensus is that about one ton of water, 2 65 gallons,
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is required to move each ton of coal in a 50 percent slurry.
A pipeline of ETSI's size is reputed to need at least 15,000
acre feet per year in moving 25 million tons of coal [69:5-26]
.
While surface water is generally either committed or will be
committed as the population of the West doubles over the next
20 years, there are according to the OTA study "sufficient un-
used quantities of suitable water (which) are physically present,
although not necessarily legally available, for the operation
of several slurry pipelines from western coal producing areas."
[67:5-26] In this region, it has been estimated that an average
of 3.8 million acre feet of unallocated Wyoming surface water is
allowed to flow out of the state and eventually into the Gulf of
Mexico annually [2:9]. Just the unappropriated shares of the
Tongue, Power, North Platte, and Cheyenne Rivers, some 265,000
annual acre-feet, would be significantly more than enough to
feed all of the slurry projects originating in the State of
Wyoming [96:91]. In addition to these resources, the Bureau of
Reclamation claims that more than 3 million acre feet of the Oahe
reservoir could be used for coal development purposes [2:9]
.
Even if surface water were totally committed, tremendous
groundwater resources such as the 188,000 square mile Madison
aquifer, are known to exist in the Great Plains and Rocky Moun-
tain States. Unfortunately, hydrology, like medicine, is not
near as refined as one might think and therefore, despite a mass
of available data, there is an inadequate data base from which
to draw long-range conclusions regarding groundwater's potential
in supporting long range ventures. Some scientists claim that
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the effect of a 15,0.00 acre-^foot drawdown in Wyoming may, haye
an adverse effect at some point in Montana or South Dakota, but
other hydrologists claim that such advertisements are only scare
tactics 1 69; 27] ..
Controversy, such as that illustrated above, has tended to
obscure the real issue of water availability. Using the Madison
Aquifer as an example, its recharge rate has been stated publi-
cally to be 8,000 acre-feet per year by Dr. Perry Rand of the
South Dakota School of Mines, 150,000 acre-feet per year by Hugh
H. Hudson of the U. S. Geological Survey, and some unknown
quantity by the Wyoming State Engineer [97:7; 98:45; 99:6].
With such variant scientific opinions, it is no wonder that both
sides of the coal slurry water issue claim to be right. The OTA
found that the Rand Study based its rate on an unrealistic as-
sumption that no leakage occurs between upper level aquifers,
such as the Minnelusa Formation, and lower aquifers, such as the
Madison, and therefore it is likely to be erroneous. At the same
time, the OTA stated while there were some drawbacks in the Geo-
logical Survey's model of the Madison, it generally was "the
best picture of what was occurring. ..." [66:19/20]
Since neither the availability of surface water nor ground
water appears to be questioned, can the slurries really face a
water crisis? According Lo Senator Floyd Haskell (Colo.), the
answer is yes. While water is readily available for all the
methods of energy development now under consideration in the
Western States and while the coal slurry pipeline appears to be
the least water intensive process under consideration, "The
problem is that water is shipped to another area and not
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returned." [100:31] The water problem in effect is not one of
nonavailability but actually one of economics in which the Western
States are being asked to give up a valued resource without re-
muneration.
ETSI and Northwest Pipelines have both studied the economic
realities of water availability and found that their slurries
can still be operated successfully even under the rigors of
western laws. ETSI studied the cost of transporting water from
Lake Oahe to its Gillette, WY, coal fields and estimated it
would cost about $1000 per acre-foot or about 60C per ton of
water. Its total transportation costs from Wyoming to the Mid-
South area would then range to $10 per ton over the life of its
thirty-year contract and hence would constitute somewhat less
than a 6 percent increase over the Madison Aquifer base price.
ETSI cites that municipalities along the route of its aqueduct
from Oahe to Gillette could "piggy back" their water supplies
on top of those for the industrial project to the benefit of
both [2:9] .
Northwest Pipeline studied the recycling of water as a
means to reduce its water needs. Its method simply called for
two parallel pipelines to be buried in the same ditch. The
second pipeline would return 60 percent of the systems water
while increasing the overall transportation cost by 38 percent.
Some other methodologies have been studied, including the use
of other liquid mediums such as methanol, but it has been found
that the amount of water required to produce methanol far ex-
ceeds that needed for the slurry operations [101:539].
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Although the physical supplies of water are known to exist,
and the economics of slurry transport can withstand the pur-
chase or transport costs associated with medium-distance acquisi-
tion, water permits can still be difficult to obtain because of
interstate compacts, the appropriation rights doctrine, restric-
tive state statues, and federal ownership.
Interstate compacts are agreements between states which
share common water sources which allocate the amount of water
that each may take from the source without prior agreement among
all of the compacts' participants. Compacts exist for virtually
every river flowing through the seventeen western states but are
most widely known in the Rocky Mountain and Great Plains States
[96:87] .
The appropriations rights doctrine is based on a "first come,
first served" philosophy. Anyone or any company may file for
specific rights to any reasonable amount of water from any re-
source and if its right is granted, the claimant is granted title
to that amount of water after all others with prior granted rights
have been satisfied. The holder of a relatively recent right may
find it difficult to appropriate any water during times of scarcity
[66:18] .
Restrictive state laws abound in the West and they must be
dealt with prior to any large scale investment activity [102:97].
For instance, Colorado has a statue which prohibits the exporta-
tion of water [1Q2;99J. Wyoming requires special permission for
use of water in coal transportation [101:539], and Montana has




Federal ownership represents a sizable voice in the eleven
Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast States. The Interior Depart-
ment (DOT), through its agencies, manages large expanses of
the West and much of its mineral and water development. Over
48 percent of all the western land is controlled by DOI . One
DOI agency, the Bureau of Land Management, administers over 3 58
million acres of the western Federal land alone. Table III
shows the percentage of Federally-owned lands by state in the
affected region. In addition to its sizable holdings, the DOI
controls vast quantities of water held beneath its lands as
well as the resources held in 174 irrigation projects built at
a cost of $8 billion under the Reclamation Act of 1902 [104:149].
Use of these waters requires the issuance of Federal permits,
which in turn requires compliance with the Environmental Protec-
tion Act, the Clean Water Act, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, just to name a few acts. The Black Mesa line uses
DOI water from an Indian reservation administered by the Bureau
of Land Management and has provided a valuable service to the
Geological Survey by running an extensive groundwater monitoring
program since 1971 [105:94].
Despite the considerable discussion generated over water
availability for coal slurries, it generally has been unfounded
and fraught with emotion. Slurry advocates have made good headway
in the water area and presently the following observations can be
made;
1. The State Engineer of Utah has granted a water per-
mit for the Alton Pipeline [9:10].
2. The Wyoming legislature has approved ETSI's use of
water for its pipeline [72:33].
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3. The San Marco pipeline has a tentative April water
court date which it believes will give it water rights by the
Summer of 1979 112]
.
4. Although the Wytex has not yet secured water, it
might easily follow any of the routes described as available
to ETSI during the discussion of this chapter since its intent
is to originate in the same locale.
5. The Gulf-Interstate Northwest line is inactive and
presently requires no resources. The Florida line has idt yet
announced its route. The Cadiz is not operational. The Black
Mesa has current resources in use.
TABLE III















V. THE CASE FOR COAL SLURRY PIPELINES
The return to coal, whether it be for political expedience
or pure greed, has introduced a significant number of new pro-
blems for the American public. One of the most overlooked pro-
blems is how best to transport the commodity. Americans are
spoiled, even callous in their regard for transportation sub-
systems. After all, when you have built manned vehicles that
have landed on the moon and unmanned ones that have looked
closely at the majority of this solar system, a great many people
begin not to be surprised when a new technology arises. Hence,
when hugh liquidified natural gas (LNG) tankers, such as Leo
(93 6 feet, 95,000 tons) were developed, the public did not bat
an eye [106:9]. However, as LNG tankers began to arrive at Point
Cove, Maryland, note was hastily made of the potential hazard
that existed [107:6]. In fact, an anti-LNG movement quickly
mounted and the search for a west coast port has been the sub-
ject of intense opposition because of the perceived threat im-
posed by LNG. While the California Public Utility Commission (PUC)
approved a siting at Cojo Bay, near Point Conception, in August
of 1978, opposition has been stiff to the project. Over two
years of study will be required prior to Federal approval of
that site and during that time opponents hope to eliminate the
siting without having to resort to court action 1108:12].
The situation for coal transport is quite similar to that
for LNG.. First, coal like LNG is required in tremendous quanti-
ties. The quantities defy human perception. Even when measured
87

in train loads rather than tons, 1.2 billion tons equate to
120,000 train loads of coat when you assume train lengths to be
100 cars. The Federal Energy Administration (FEA) states that
60 percent of 1985 traffic will be from the western coal fields,
therefore, 72,000 of these train loads will be coming from the
Rocky Mountain/Northern Great Plains region, a region called by
many the Western coal axis. It has been previously noted that
the EPRI had studied rail capacity in that area and found it
to be lacking at the present time. A new study, as yet unpub-
lished, will shortly confirm that issue. Therefore, the rail-
road must build, in an area where costs will be more expensive
because of the terrain, to improve their capacity. In addition,
because of the tremendous increase in traffic from 13,500 units
in 1976 [109:113] to 72,000 in 1985, maintenance requirements
will be staggering.
Although a number of studies, mostly government prepared or
sponsored, indicate that the railroads can handle increased
traffic, a number of private studies have indicated that this
is not so. Where many government studies, including the one
performed by the prestigious OTA, have given railroads the eco-
nomic edge over slurries, it has been in those cases where track-
age requirements were pre-existent . In any scenario where con-
struction is required, pipelines enjoy a significant advantage
over railroads. A concern to some is the effect of railroad
construction on the taxpayer, in that many of the railroads have




The environmental and social impacts created by rail expan-
sion are being challenged presently. Detractors of coal move-
ment by rail point to the 550 percent increase in traffic with
alarm. Rural and urban life will be effected. Derailments,
already occurring at a rate of 20,000 per year, will increase.
Grade crossing fatalities, fires, cost dust scattering, and
noise levels will unquestionably grow [110:3].
Railroads, when placed in this perspective, begin to lose
their allure. Unfortunately, they must be used and they must be
expanded despite the consequences. Even if all of the actively
proposed western slurries (ETSI, Wytex, San Marco, Alton) were
built and placed in operation prior to 198 5, their combined
movements would only account for 7 3.6 million tons annually,
while overall production in the West would increase by 505 mil-
lion tons. Obviously, the railroads will still need to increase
their capacity nearly five-fold [109:112]. Fortunately, one
railroad, the Denver and Rio Grande Western (D&RGW), has realized
that the existing transportation system cannot perform the job
that will be required and, therefore, has joined with the Southern
Pacific in pioneering slurry transport. Its line, the San Marco,
has been designed to fully incorporate and coordinate the use of
its rail lines to complement the new slurry [110:2] . Aggressive
thinking such as that exhibited by the D&RGW is required if the
country is to win its fight to move Western coal.
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VI. THE CASE AGAINST COAL SLURRY PIPELINES
Although a number of arguments have been raised in opposi-
tion to coal slurry pipelines, most of them have proven to be
indefensible. One argument though has proven to be quite viable
and has a substantial body of support. That opposition view is
voiced by a constituency which sees the revitalization and rehabi-
litation of the national rail system as a vital national goal.
To understand their sentiment requires a basic knowledge regard-
ing the decline of the American railroad.
The twentieth century has been unkind to the railroads. A
series of events beginning with the rail collapse and subsequent
nationalization of the system in 1918 began the industry's pro-
blems. The Great Depression compounded its woes [111:65-75].
Massive post-World War II commitments of public funds to aid
other transport modes had a substantially adverse impact on the
system [112:9]
.
The decade of the sixties was extremely exasperating. Rail-
road after railroad failed financially in the Eastern districts.
The industry which had once produced an attractive return for share-
holders lost its prestige. Even the rail companies themselves be-
gan to look for non-railroad ventures in which to invest their
revenues. Those carriers which completed such transitions now
often find that their non-rail earnings often must carry the
rail portion of their financial statements [112:7].
Following the collapse of the Penn Central, America's lar-
gest railroad, and eight other lines in the Northeast, unprecedented
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legislation was introduced to try and resolve the problems of
the eastern railroads. A 1973 attempt, the Regional Rail Reor-
ganization Act (3R) , created the Consolidated Railroad Corp.
(ConRail) in an attempt to salvage the remnants of the collapsed
Northeast section. Unfortunately, the experiment has been costly
and it continues to grow more so every year [111:7 4] ..
Further failures occurred through the mid-197 *s and sub-
sequent legislation, the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act (4R) , enacted in 1976, created a loan fund of $1.6
billion to provide for revitalization and rehabilitation of the
sagging industry. As previously stated the resolution of the
rail problem was deemed as vital to the national interests
[112:31] .
Despite the best intentions of Congress, the plummet has
continued. On April 12, 1978, the AAR announced that the indus-
try-wide operating income for 1977 was at its lowest since the
Great Depression [113:1] . When figures for the first half of
1978 were released on October 11, 1978, operating incomes had
continued their decline. An industry-wide operating deficit of
$71.4 million was registered. Only the coal roads reported
profits, but even their figures were depressed from the 1977
levels of the earlier report [114:1],
With the financial health of America's railroads in such a
deplorable condition, a small impact could have severe reper-
cussions. In 1976, coal, the number one commodity carried by
railroads, represented the following to the railroads:
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1. 29% of tonnage originated - 4 07.5 million tons
2. 19.9% of 'carloadings -4.7 million
3. 19.5% of total ton miles - 146.6 billion
4. 14% of gross freight revenues - $2.4 billion {115:A].
Obviously, coal traffic and revenues are not distributed
evenly throughout the industry, but coal is the one commodity
which accounts for the financial health of nine of the ten strong-
est railroads [112:18; 115:A]. Without coal revenues, a col-
lapse of the entire system could probably occur. AAR presidnet
William Dempsey told the National Association of Regulatory Uti-
lity Commissioners in November of 1977 that:
Coal slurry pipelines need not be financially success-
ful to damage the railroads. Damage . . . will result
from (their) mere existence. . . because no construc-
tion will begin until such a (long term) contract,
used as a financing vehicle, is in hand. . . .
[41:17] .
In that same speech, he emphasized that the slurries would
"skim the cream" 'from the most, lucrative routes. In his 1978
statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands and
Resources on S.707 (The Coal Pipeline Act of 1978), he indicated
that such a drain would hurt Midwestern railroads attempting a
recovery under the 4R Act. He said, "Any reduction in revenue
could represent a threat to the financial health of any particular
railroad." His sentiment has been confirmed by the Congress'
own OTA study [41; 17]
.
Whether coal pipelines are to be constructed or not will de-
pend in part on hew persuasively the arguments can be made to
supporters of America's railroads. A strong group of Congressmen
sitting on the Transportation Subcommittee of the House Commerce
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Committee effectively defeated coal slurry legislation in 1978.
Until the slurry proponents can demonstrate that their operations
will not harm railroads, they may find the long and arduous fight
to overcome the railroad obstacle may never end.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. GENERAL
It is quite evident that no confluent opinion exists
regarding the viability of slurry pipelines in the United
States. While a growing body of literature points to the
socio-economic considerations inherent in coal slurry pipe-
line transit as an obvious advantage over rail transport, it
appears that much of the data is a subsequent rehashing of
the basic research done by a small corps of pioneers in the
field. Although slurry technology is unquestionably sound, its
detractors have attempted to discredit its apparent advantages
and exploit its congenital weaknesses.
The modern coal slurry's oldest and most vehement foe is the
railroad industry, a decaying but somewhat permanent institu-
tion that sees the slurry as a competitor rather than as an op-
portunity for expansion. With undue diligence a number of rail-
road companies have undertaken a systematic pattern of diversi-
fying into non-railroad industries. Some, such as the Illinois
Central, now IC Industries, and the Burlington Northern, now
Burlington Northern, Inc., have moved into a number of ventures
not only atypical of railroading, but also atypical of trans-
portation; while other, such as the Southern Pacific and the Santa
Pe, have diversified within the transportation spectrum. The
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. fully developed the Black
Mesa line as an extension of its obligations to the shipping
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public, and Rio Grande Industries is presently prepared to do
the same in constructing the San Marco Pipeline. Obviously, an
economic alliance between the slurry and railroad industries might
prove to be synergetic.
Coal slurry pipelines can provide an invaluable service to
the shipping public. Indeed, the re-emergence of this dormant
technology after nearly seventy years was hastened by the public's
economic needs. Rapidly rising rail rates were arrested and
subsequently decreased in direct response to the construction
of the Cadiz pipeline. In addition the competitive forces of
the pipeline hastened the development of the unit train concept,
now the mainstay of coal transport.
Despite the slurry's potential for good, a paradox exists.
It could have an adverse effect on a number of railroads. Some
would argue that the entire rail rate structure would be dashed
if slurries were built, thus causing massive rate increases
across the board in all commodity groupings, and ultimately
casting a negative effect upon the entire citizenry of the United
States. Although the possibility exists that some railroads would
fail as a result of competition, fear should not be used as the
guiding factor in the marketplace. Because proper economic
theory suggests that the issue of which transportation system
survives in cases of severe competition is normally determined
by which of the systems provides price and service superiority,
some "constructive" destruction should be allowed to occur when-
ever a new industry such as coal pipelines come into being in





1. The Coal Issue
As coal fortunes go, so do the needs for its transporta-
tion. A number of collateral factors; namely, energy legislation,
environmental quality standards, strip mining regulation,
development of other on-going energy options, etc., all will
have a direct effect on coal consumption in the foreseeable future,
With coal presently enjoying a renascence, slurry proponents
are in an excellent position to exploit the present transporta-
tion system's apparent inability to satisfy a number of large
consumers' demands for economic pricing. If the fortunes of
coal do not wane before the slurry advocates can solve their





While a grant of federal eminent domain cannot be pre-
dicted, it appears that the rudimentary procedures for acquiring
rights-of-way along most of the lines presently proposed have
been overcome at either the state levels or in the courts. Ag-
gressive lobbying for and against slurries will be continued
in both the U. S. House of Representatives and the legislatures
of both Kansas and Nebraska until either statues are enacted or
coal is again relegated to obscurity.
3 Environmental Issues
None of the environmental questions associated with
the construction of coal pipelines have merit. In fact, the
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pipeline option appears to be more sound from an environmental
and aesthetic standpoint than the railroads.. Even a comparison
of the social impacts created by the construction and operations
of either rail or slurry modes would tend to favor the use of
the slurry option.
4. Water Issue
The water issue is a facade. Water exists in sufficient
quantity to transport all of the coal presently proposed to be
transported by slurry. In fact, the real issue does not appear
to be related to quantity, rather it is one of penuriousness
on the part of Westerners. They do not like the idea of "exporting"
water without getting something in return. Money has solved this





Unless the regulatory framework of the Interstate Com-
merce Act is altered to either give the coal pipelines common
carrier status or to allow the railroads to enter into long-term
contracts (it cannot as a common carrier) , true competition, in
the direct sense, will not exist between coal pipelines and the
railroads. An indirect form of competition would exist because
the two systems would vie for the transportation dollars of the
same customers. The railroads have in the past been able to tie
their customers to "economic" contracts by requiring them to
purchase and maintain private fleets of coal cars. If this prac-
tice is formalized, a direct form of price competition will ensue.
If it is disallowed, the competition will be at two different





While pipelines promise economies not possible to rail-
roads, it is unclear whether or not such savings can be delivered.
A number of studies have indicated that in some cases railroads
can be more economical than slurries, however, the data presented
in most of these studies acknowledge the sources of their data
as being either the prejudiced industries or other studies which
employed prejudicial material. An honest evaluation cannot be
made as to the economic vulnerability of the railroads or the
economic potentiality of the pipelines; however, the proliferation
of slurries will be assured if a measure of economic success is
accorded to them during actual operations. While their through-
put capabilities and hence their economic capacities have been
constrained to 3 8-inch or less diameter pipe produced in the
U.S., the Japanese have recently begun to roll seamless 56-inch
pipe [116] which could double slurry capacity and provide such
an economic advantage that the railroads would be forced to
withdraw from the coal distribution game on a large scale.
7
.
The Transportation Capacity or Needs Issue
Slurries are needed. Despite assurances from the AAR,
the Government, and some pro-railroad interests, doubt remains
as to the ability of the railroads to fully cope with the tre-
mendous increases of coal. Numerical analysis dictates caution
be applied in accepting the railroads claim that no capacity
problem exists. While rail equipment and financing appear secure,
facilities and maintenance appear to be the weaklinks in expanding
rail capacity. These constraints will require significant amounts




This study has been constrained by parameters beyond the
author's control. Despite a thorough research of vast quantities
of data, no first hand information was available in compiling this
study. Unfortunately, much of the literature surrounding the is-
sues of the coal pipeline controversy is biased. Because of the
size and the affluence of the corporations and political entities
involved, both pro and con, an air of creditability embodies the
reports prepared either directly by them or for them. However,
close examination shows much of the literature to be erroneous,
fallacious, arbitrary, and callous. The records of the hearings
before Congress regarding eminent domain reveal misrepresentation
after misrepresentation of the facts. The OTA study which was
to be the ultimate answer for a number of the controversial issues
has proven nothing.
This thesis, although fastidiously prepared, cannot emphati-
cally answer any of the controversial questions either. It is
not known how much water is in the Madison or how the price of
Texas legnite will ultimately affect the price of water in South
Dakota. While this thesis has met its objectives of examining,
analyzing, and commenting upon the issues, the author's ability
to draw rational conclusions concerning the issues is unquestion-
ably tainted by the literature used in the research of this paper.
Therefore, it is recommended that further basic research be under-
taken to determine conclusively if the data quoted in this study
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